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GOVERNMENT INTRUSION UPON
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS-
WEATHERFORD V. BURSEY
Privacy of attorney-client communications is protected by the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee that a criminal defendant "have the Assist-
ance of Counsel for his defense." 1  When the government intrudes
into the legal camp of the defense, via undercover agent or electronic
monitor, does the Sixth Amendment's right to effective assistance of
counsel demand reversal of the defendant's conviction and a new
trial? In Weatherford v. Bursey,2 the Supreme Court determined
that in the absence of a purposeful intrusion, tainted evidence pre-
sented at trial, or communication of defense strategy to the prosecu-
tion, a defendant has not been deprived of the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel. Therefore, reversal and new trial are not mandated
by the Sixth Amendment.
Petitioner Weatherford, while working as an undercover agent in
1970, participated with respondent Bursey in a draft board demon-
stration which resulted in their arrest for the malicious destruction of
property. 3 After indictment, while posing as a co-defendant,
Weatherford participated in two meetings with Bursey and his attor-
ney at which the upcoming trial was discussed. 4 Bursey's subsequent
conviction was due in large part to Weatherford's eyewitness tes-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Privacy of attorney-client communications is also protected by
the common-law attorney-client privilege:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in
his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
8 WcMomE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961). The constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel is a much broader right than the common-law privilege, which is said to be
strictly construed within the narrowest possible limits. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American
Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
2. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
3. Weatherford, an employee of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED)
serving as an undercover agent on the University of South Carolina Campus, was released
within hours of his arrest. Bursey remained in jail for twelve days and was told by SLED agents
that Weatherford was also still in jail. Upon Bursey's release, Weatherford confirmed his fellow
agents' falsifications.
In order to maintain the co-defendant deception, Solicitor Foard made arrangements for a
lawyer, Frank Taylor, to appear to represent Weatherford. Bursey's lawyer was completely de-
ceived by Taylor's purported representation of Weatherford. Brief for Respondent at 9-11,
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
4. Discussion included defense tactics generally, Weatherford's plans to seek a severance,
and the problem of a possible informer. Weatherford suggested that a third participant, Mer-
rick, might be an agent. Since Weatherford denied that he would testify against Bursey, and
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:203
timony at trial. 5 The prosecution disavowed any calculated plan of
using Weatherford as a witness, claiming that the decision that he
testify was made on the day of Bursey's trial. The decision was a
result of Weatherford's having been seen in the company of law en-
forcement agents, thus losing some of his effectiveness for undercover
work. 6 Bursey, upon completing his prison sentence, commenced a
federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 19837 seeking redress
from Weatherford and his superior for violation of his constitutional
rights, including his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance
of counsel. 8
The district court concluded that Bursey's constitutional rights had
not been violated because Weatherford did not communicate the sub-
Merrick was believed to be out of the country, it was determined that the State would be
unable to prove by direct testimony that Bursey was present at the draft board demonstration.
At the second meeting it was also determined that Bursey would not testify. Id. at 14-16.
5. Id. at 17.
6. Weatherford went on a weekend vacation with fellow SLED agents to Hilton Head, a
plush South Carolina resort. Thinking that he might have been seen there by a friend of Bur-
sey's, Weatherford attempted to preserve the co-defendant deception by telling Bursey that a
benefactor named Dr. Hardwick had insisted he discuss his case with the police. Weatherford
assured Bursey that he would not cooperate with government officials and had rejected all their
overtures. Id. at 15.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
For an extensive discussion of the background of § 1983 and suggestions for improving its
effectiveness in vindicating constitutional rights, see Note, Developments in the Law-Section
1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1133 (1977).
Although § 1983 was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, it was seldom used for
almost a century because of restrictive judicial construction. The volume of litigation increased,
however, after the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), which
held that proof of neither willful conduct nor invocation of state remedies was required to state
a cause of action under the statute. As a result of this increased litigation, courts have begun to
fashion doctrines to limit § 1983 lawsuits. In addition, recovery is unlikely for a plaintiff who is a
former criminal defendant and is viewed in an unfavorable light by members of the jury. Be-
cause of these difficulties, the § 1983 damage action has proved largely ineffective as a mechan-
ism for obtaining compensation for this class of plaintiffs. Id.
8. Respondent also contended that Weatherford's assertion, up until the day of the trial,
that he would not testify against Bursey operated to deprive him of due process of law in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment The court of appeals agreed with this contention,
reasoning that the prosecution's conduct lulled Bursey into a false sense of security, denying
him the opportunity to plea bargain, to do a background check on Weatherford for cross-exami-
nation purposes, and to counter the impact of eyewitness identification. Bursey v. Weatherford,
528 F.2d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court, observing that there is no right under
the Constitution to plea bargaining or to discovery in a criminal case, found respondent's due
process argument to be without merit. 429 U.S. at 559-61.
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stance of any overheard conversations to the prosecution.9 Moreover,
his presence at those discussions resulted not from any hope of ob-
taining privileged information, but from a desire merely to protect his
cover. 1° The court of appeals, 1 ' unimpressed by the district court's
finding that Weatherford communicated nothing to the prosecution,' 2
reversed Bursey's conviction.' 3 Finding the government's motive for
intruding upon the conferences to be of no consequence, the court
concluded that the Sixth Amendment is violated whenever the gov-
ernment intrudes upon the privacy of attorney-client relations. 1
4
The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, found no Sixth Amendment
violation. 15  The Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not es-
tablish a per se right to reversal and a new trial whenever the gov-
ernment intrudes upon defense conferences. It concluded, rather,
that in the absence of a purposeful intrusion, tainted evidence used at
trial, or disclosure to the prosecution of information gleaned from
defense strategy sessions, there was no violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment.16 This Note will examine the reasoning the Court employed to
so constrict a defendant's right to private consultation with counsel. It
will demonstrate the majority's misuse of precedent and expose the
superficial nature of the Court's analysis. Finally, Weatherford's im-
pact on the security of attorney-client relations will be discussed.
The per se rule of reversal and retrial favored by the court of ap-
peals is hardly a novel formulation. 17 Two cases dealing squarely
with the effect ,of government eavesdropping on defense conferences
were decided early in the 1950's by the Court of Appeals for the
9. Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1975).
10. id.
11. For a discussion endorsing the court of appeals decision, see Note, Constitutional
Law-Bursey v. Weatherford: The Sixth Amendment Protection Against Secret Agents in the
"Counsels of Defense," 54 N.C. L. REv. 1276 (1976).
12. The court of appeals reasoned that Weatherford was himself a member of the prosecu-
tion. Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 1975).
13. Id. at 489.
14. The court of appeals concluded that "whenever the prosecution knowingly arranges or
permits intrusion into the attorney-client relationship the right to counsel is sufficiently en-
dangered to require reversal and a new trial." Id. at 486. However, because Bursey had already
completed his sentence, reversal and retrial was no longer possible. He therefore sought relief
by way of a damage action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See note 7 supra.
15. 429 U.S. 545 (1977). Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Marshall,
joined by Justice Brennan, dissented. Id. at 561 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 558.
17. The Court, in referring to the per se rule as "the rule announced by the Court of
Appeals," implied that the rule originated with the appellate court opinion in this case. This
reference to the rule as a new one is misleading. See notes 18-39 and accompanying text infra.
A statement with similar effect is the assertion that the "exact contours of the Court of Appeals'
per se right-to-counsel rule are difficult to discern .... ' 429 U.S. at 550.
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District of Columbia Circuit. In Coplon v. United States, I8 govern-
ment wiretapping resulted in interception of attorney-client conversa-
tions. The court held that the right to assistance of counsel was so
fundamental that a verdict of guilty must be set aside whenever that
right has been denied, regardless of any showing of prejudice to the
defendant's case. 19 This rule of automatic reversal was applied in
Caldwell v. United States 20 to government eavesdropping by way of
undercover agent. The court saw no reason for differentiating be-
tween intrusion by means of wiretapping and intrusion by means of
secret agents, and again indicated that a right to retrial should not be
conditioned upon a showing of prejudice. 2'
The Coplon-Caldwell principle 2 2 at least impliedly found expres-
sion in two Warren Court decisions in the late sixties. In Black v.
United States,23 attorney-client conversations were monitored by
F.B.I. agents, and memoranda concerning the overheard conversa-
tions were made available to the prosecution. 24 The Court, in a per
curiam opinion, vacated the conviction and remanded the case for a
18. 191 ,F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
19. Id. at 759. The accused, Judith Coplon, was an employee of the Department of Justice
assigned to the Internal Security Section to examine F.B.I. reports relative to the activities of
Russian agents or Communists. When she came under suspicion by the F.B.I., appellant was
directed by her superior to no longer examine the reports. She nevertheless managed to obtain
several documents and made three trips to New York City to deliver copies of them to
Gubitchev, a Russian national. Unaware that F.B.I. agents were following her and observing
her movements, appellant was arrested in New York and underwent trial there, as well as in
the District of Columbia. During a pretrial hearing in New York, appellant for the first time
discovered that her telephone wires had been tapped by F.B.I. agents before, during, and after
her District of Columbia trial and that conversations between her and her attorney had been
intercepted. The court of appeals set aside the order denying a motion for a new trial and
remanded the case for a hearing merely to determine whether the alleged interceptions had
actually occurred. The court directed that if they had, a new trial was to be ordered. Id. at
750-52, 756-57, 760.
20. 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953). Caldwell was indicted for attempting to obstruct justice
in the criminal trial of another person. While under indictment, appellant and his attorney
became intimately acquainted with agent Bradley and solicited his cooperation in preparing the
defense. In his dual capacity as defense assistant and government agent, Bradley gained free
access to information covering many matters connected with the impending trial. When
Caldwell discovered Bradley's double dealing, he filed a motion for a new trial, alleging viola-
tion of his right to effective representation by counsel. The court of appeals considered its
decision in Coplon to be controlling and awarded a new trial. Id. at 879-81.
21. Id. at 881.
22. Judge Winner so termed the rule of those decisions in United States v. Orman, 417 F.
Supp. 1126, 1135 (D. Colo. 1976).
23. 385 U.S. 26 (1966).
24. Id. at 27-28. The Solicitor General advised the Court that F.B.I. agents, in connection
with an investigation unrelated to the tax evasion charges, had installed a listening device in
petitioner's hotel suite about two months before evidence was presented to the grand jury. The
monitoring agents overheard conversations between petitioner and his attorney. Although the
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new trial. 25  Four months later, in O'Brien v. United States,2 6 the
Court again vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial even
though no F.B.I. reports concerning the intercepted lawyer-client
conversations were made available to the prosecution. 27 In each in-
stance the Solicitor General advocated remand for an adversary
hearing to determine the effect of government activity on the validity
of the convictions; 28 and in each instance the Supreme Court chose
instead to remand for an entirely new trial. The Court's action im-
pliedly affirmed the per se rule of reversal announced in Coplon and
Caldwell as a sanction against government intrusion into the counsels
of defense. 29
While the lower federal courts have universally recognized 30 what
the Third Circuit termed "the rule announced in Black and
O'Brien,"31 some of them have interpreted certain statements made
in Hoffa v. United States 32 as modifying the per se rule. 33 This de-
cision involved the use of an informer who overheard conversations
recordings had been erased from the tapes, notes summarizing and often quoting the conversa-
tions were included in material transmitted to the Tax Division attorneys. The Solicitor Gen-
eral advised the Court that the Tax Division attorneys did not receive the materials until an
advanced stage of trial preparations and had found nothing relevant to the tax evasion charges.
id.
25. Id. at 29.
26. 386 U.S. 345 (1967).
27. Id. at 346 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Petitioners O'Brien and Parisi were charged with
removing merchandise from a bonded area under the supervision of the United States Customs
Service in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 549 (1948). The Solicitor General advised the Court that a
microphone had been installed in a commercial establishment owned by a friend of O'Brien's.
O'Brien was overheard placing a call to his attorneys requesting that one of them file an applica-
tion relating to the territorial conditions of his release on bail. Although the conversation was
noted in the logs, it was not communicated in any way outside the F.B.I. Id. at 345-46.
28. 385 U.S. at 28; 386 U.S. at 346 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
29. It has been observed that the Supreme Court, in Black and O'Brien, had finally come to
consider the issue of government intrusion upon attorney-client communications, and, in so
doing, reasserted the Coplon-Caldwell no-prejudice rule. Note, Government Interceptions of
Attorney-Client Communications, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 87, 95 (1974).
30. In United States v. Orman, 417 F. Supp. 1126, 1135 (D. Colo. 1976) the court stated
that "the Coplon-Caldwell principle ... has been universally recognized by the lower courts
which have had occasion to study the matter." See, e.g., United States v. Choate, 527 F.2d
748, 751 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Gartner, 518 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1975); United
States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1224 (2d Cir. 1973); United States V. Rispo, 460 F.2d 965,
975-77 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Zarzour, 432 F.2d 1, 3-4 (5th Cir. 1970); Taglianetti v.
United States, 398 F.2d 558, 569-70 (1st Cir. 1968); United States v. Ostrer, 422 F. Supp. 93,
104-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
31. United States v. Rispo, 460 F.2d 965, 977 (3d Cir. 1972).
32. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Choate, 527 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Gartner, 518 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1227 (2d
Cir. 1973).
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between Hoffa and his lawyers. The Court in Hoffa described Coplon
and Caldwell as cases dealing with government intrusion "of the gross-
est kind" 4 upon the confidential lawyer-client relationship. Lower
federal courts have often interpreted this dictum in Hoffa as an au-
thoritative modification of the per se rule of reversal35 and have
therefore required that an intrusion be gross in order to trigger the
operation of that rule.3 6 An intrusion has been considered gross
when it is purposeful3 7 or when, through communication of defense
plans to the prosecution, it results in tainted evidence.3 8 In focusing
upon the Hoffa dictum, these lower courts have neglected the actual
holding in that case. The Hoffa Court merely held that, except in
extraordinary circumstances, when a government agent intrudes upon
defense conferences, he may nevertheless testify about matters unre-
lated to the overheard conversations at a subsequent trial on different
charges.3 9
34. 385 U.S. 293, 306 (1966).
35. It has been observed that the Hoffa decision "has borne interesting fruit in the lower
federal courts." Cited as most notable was United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.
1973), wherein the court applied the "contrapositive to Hoffa." Rather than regarding gross-
ness as one of the factors sufficient to warrant application of the per se rule, the court treated it
as a necessary prerequisite for application of that rule. Note, Government Interceptions of
Attorney-Client Communications, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 87, 97-98 (1974).
36. See United States v. Choate, 527 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1975) ("gross surreptitious
governmental invasions into the legal camp of the defense . . . may violate defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel"); United States v. Gartner, 518 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1975) (The
per se rule represents a moral condemnation of "egregious and unequivocal conduct" on the
part of the Government and has been applied to Government intrusions upon the attorney-
client relationship only where there was an "offensive" interference "without any justification");
United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1227 (2d Cir. 1973) ("When the Government is not
found guilty of such avowed corrupting conduct . . . the rule must, of necessity, be different");
United States v. Oster, 422 F. Supp. 93, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (The application of a per se rule
"has been reserved for those instances where the conduct of the Government has been 'man-
ifestly and avowedly corrupt' ").
37. See United States v. Gartner, 518 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1227 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Ostrer, 422 F. Supp. 93, 104
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
38. See United States v. Zarzour, 432 F.2d 1, 3-5 (5th Cir. 1970).
39. 385 U.S. at 307-08. James Hoffa, former president of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, was tried in 1962 for violation of the Taft-Hartley Act, and the jury in that trial,
known as the Test Fleet trial, hung. He was then tried for endeavoring to bribe members of
that jury. During the course of the Test Fleet trial, an informer, Edward Partin, was continu-
ally in the company of Hoffa and his associates in and around the hotel suite, which Hoffa's
lawyers used each day as a place to confer with each other, to interview witnesses, and to plan
the following day's trial strategy. Partin made frequent reports to federal agent Sheridan con-
cerning efforts to bribe members of the Test Fleet jury. Hoffa contended that this intrusion
upon the security of his attorney-client relationship violated his Sixth Amendment right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel in the second trial. The Supreme Court held that while it might be
possible to imagine a case in which the Government's previous activities in undermining a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights at one trial would render evidence obtained thereby inad-
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The Court in Weatherford contended that Black and O'Brien far
from establishing a per se rule, do not even lend it support °4 0  In
reaching this conclusion, the Court characterized Black and O'Brien
as cases primarily concerned with Fourth Amendment issues.41  The
Court stressed the fact that they both involved electronic surveillance
and that the Sixth Amendment was not even mentioned in the Black
per curiam opinion. 42  However, neither the Fourth nor the Sixth
Amendment was mentioned; and the narration of the facts in Black
clearly reveals that the Court's primary concern was the intercepted
lawyer-client conversations. 43 Moreover, reference to Black and
O'Brien is universally made in the context of a Sixth Amendment
issue. 44
While the casting of these cases in a Fourth Amendment role is
unpersuasive, 45 it did provide the uncertain foundation upon which
the Court then erected its own interpretation of Black and O'Brien.
Having indicated that those cases probably have nothing to say about
the Sixth Amendment, the Court conceded that if they have any rel-
evance at all to attorney-client concerns, it is that when conversations
with counsel have been overheard, the validity of the conviction de-
pends on whether the overheard conversations have produced any
evidence presented at trial.46
As Justice Marshall argued in his dissent, such an inference
"twists" Black and O'Brien "beyond recognition." 47 The majority in
Weatherford simply refused to recognize that a per se rule impliedly
was established in Black and O'Brien. Justice Harlan, who dissented
in Black, acknowledged that the Court was promulgating a rule of
automatic reversal in that case. Though reluctant to believe that the
Warren Court was making "any such sweeping innovation" in the
criminal law, Justice Harlan conceded that the only basis for justifying
missible in a different trial on separate charges, the Hoffa trial for attempting to bribe jurors did
not remotely approach such a situation. Id. at 294-96, 304-05, 308.
40. 429 U.S. at 551.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 567 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44. See Hoffa v. United States, 387 U.S. 231, 233 (1967); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293, 307 (1966); United States v. Choate, 527 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1224 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Rispo, 460 F.2d 965, 975-76 (3d
Cir. 1972); United States v. Zarzour, 432 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1970); Taglianetti v. United States,
398 F.2d 558, 569-70 (1st Cir. 1968); United States v. Ostrer, 422 F. Supp. 93, 104 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); United States v. Orman, 417 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (D. Colo. 1976); People v. Knippen
berg, 66 l1.2d 276, 285, 362 N.E.2d 681, 685 (1977).
45. 429 U.S. at 567 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 552.
47. Id. at 567 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the Court's reversal was that any governmental intrusion of this kind
"automatically vitiates" the conviction. 48  Thus, even the dissent in
Black attests to the fact that the Warren Court was establishing a per
se rule of reversal as a sanction against govenmental intrusion upon
defense conferences.
The Weatherford Court's interpretation of Hoffa, while not clearly
inaccurate, is nearly as misleading as its treatment of Black and
O'Brien. The actual Hoffa ruling was all but omitted in the Court's
opinion. 49 Emphasis was placed instead on the fact that, in Hoffa,
the informer's testimony was unrelated to any overheard conversa-
tions, 50 and at least some information was communicated to the pro-
secuting attorneys. 51 The Hoffa Court did indeed refer to these
facts, 52 but neither observation was essential to the ultimate holding
in that case. The Hoffa Court held that intrusions into defense con-
ferences do not necessarily vitiate later convictions on separate
charges. Clearly, the Court did not reject the Coplon-Caldwell prin-
ciple of automatic reversal. 53  Indeed, the Hoffa decision is suppor-
tive of a per se rule. 54 The Weatherford Court camouflaged the
actual holding in Hoffa with an array of casual observations from that
opinion.
Not only did the Court present a questionable interpretation of
precedent; it also set forth requirements for finding a Sixth Amend-
ment violation without adequate explanation or support. The Court
noted that agent Weatherford communicated nothing to the prosecu-
tion concerning the overheard conversations. 55 The majority indi-
cated that, had Bursey proved communication, he might have had "a
48. 385 U.S. at 31 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
49. 429 U.S. at 552-54.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 385 U.S. at 305-06, 309.
53. United States v. Orman, 417 F. Supp. 1126, 1135 (D. Colo. 1976).
54. The Court, in Hoffa, "assume[d] that the Coplon and Caldwell cases were rightly de-
cided, and further assume[d] . . . that the Goverment's activities during [Hoffa's first] trial were
sufficiently similar to what went on in Coplon and Caldwell to invoke the rule of those deci-
sions. " 385 U.S. at 307 (emphasis added). The Hoffa Court then cited Black for the proposition
that, had Hoffa's first trial "resulted in a conviction instead of a hung jury, the conviction would
presumptively have been set aside as constitutionally defective." Id. The Court then decided
that "[e]ven assuming, therefore, as we have, that there might have been a Sixth Amendment
violation which might have made invalid a conviction, if there had been one, in the Test Fleet
case," the evidence supplied by the informer in the second Hoffa trial "was in no sense the
'fruit' of any such [Sixth Amendment] violation." Id. at 308. Thus, in its decision, the Hoffa
Court assumed the existence of the per se rule.
55. 429 U.S. at 554.
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much stronger case." 56 However, aside from Hoffa dicta, 57 the
Court offered little more to substantiate this disclosure requirement
than its own conclusory observation that unless the substance of
overheard conversations is communicated to the prosecution, there is
no "realistic possibility of injury." 58
Prejudice to the defendant's case, however, can arise despite a lack
of disclosure to the prosecution. The First Circuit has recognized that
the real nemesis is:
subtle benefits that might consciously or unconsciously accrue to
the government in knowing the planned procedure or even the
state of mind of the defendant and his counsel . . . . quite apart
from hearing affirmative evidence or leads to evidence. 59
Another court has pointed out that information learned by a gov-
ernment agent at defense conferences can be helpful in structur-
ing his testimony at trial, even if he never communicates this knowl-
edge to the prosecution.60 And with regard to prejudice in general,
the Third Circuit has observed that harmless error and untainted evi-
dence tests are incapable, in some situations, of yielding a realistic
appraisal of injury. There is often no tainted evidence which can be
isolated, and some errors which affect the entire trial process produce
effects that cannot be intelligently gauged by such methods. These
tests, whether they are designated as harmless error, untainted evi-
dence, or overwhelming evidence tests, are only effective in assessing
errors that bear on particular evidence. 61 Thus, whether or not the
substance of overheard conversations is communicated to the prosecu-
tion, the possibility of injury is indeed real and deserving of more
attention by the Court.
The motive for intruding upon the attorney-client relationship is
another factor accorded substantial weight by the Court, again with-
out serious examination. Like the lower courts which cite Hoffa for
the proposition that an intrusion must be gross, or purposeful, to
warrant application of a per se rule, 62 the Court stressed the fact that
agent Weatherford attended defense conferences solely to protect his
56. Id.
57. See notes 50-54 and accompanying text infra.
58. 429 U.S. at 558.
59. Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558, 570 (lst Cir. 1968).
60. See United States v. Orman, 417 F. Supp. 1126, 1136 (D. Colo. 1976) in which the
information obtained enabled the agents to structure an answer to an anticipated affirmative
defense.
61. United States v. Rispo, 460 F.2d 965, 974 (3d Cir. 1972).
62. See note 36 and accompanying text infra.
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cover.63 Perhaps the Court's emphasis on motive is based upon a
belief that the per se rule is a rule of deterrence. The Second Cir-
cuit has expressed the view that a per se rule must be thought of in
terms of sanctions against the government for conduct pursued in
bad faith.64  But the Supreme Court, in a different context,6 5 has
observed that "'there is another consideration -the imperative of judi-
cial integrity."' 6 6  A per se rule operates not only to deter govern-
ment misconduct, but also to preserve public confidence in our judi-
cial system. 67 Even where government conduct is pursued in good
faith, the "imperative of judicial integrity" calls for application of a
per se rule. Yet nowhere in the Court's discussion of motive is this
important value even mentioned.
Will the superficial nature of the Court's inquiry and its often
doubtful logic dull Weatherford's potential impact on Sixth Amend-
ment guarantees? An Illinois Supreme Court opinion rendered ap-
proximately three months after the decision in Weatherford serves as
a basis for prediction. In People v. Knippenberg,6 8 a murder defen-
dant's attorney obtained the services of an investigator to assist him in
interviewing some witnesses. With the attorney's approval, the in-
vestigator interviewed the defendant in jail and prepared a report
summarizing the defendant's statements. A copy of this report was
made available to the prosecution. Without ever informing defense
counsel that the report had been released, the prosecution used the
defendant's statements at trial for impeachment purposes.
In reversing the defendant's conviction, the court briefly reviewed
relevant Supreme Court precedent. Black and O'Brien were cited
first, merely for the proposition that governmental intrusions of an
even less offensive nature often result in reversal and retrial.69 No
mention was made of a per se rule emanating from those cases. To
63. 429 U.S. at 557. The Chief of the South Carolina State Law Enforcement Division
admitted, however, that after the arrest Weatherford was not working on anything particular for
which he needed to maintain his cover. The Chief further acknowledged that he was not very
concerned about losing Weatherford's cover, because he knew his identity would nonetheless
have to be revealed once the trial began. Id. at 555 n.5. Indeed, had the need for Weather-
ford's services been so acute, he certainly would not have been allowed to go on a weekend
vacation with fellow SLED agents at a popular seaside resort. Brief for Respondent at 15, 72-73.
64. United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1227 (2d Cir. 1973).
65. The Supreme Court had occasion to discuss the purpose behind a per se rule in Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which involved the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.
66. Id. at 659.
67. People v. Knippenberg, 66 ll.2d 276, 286, 362 N.E.2d 681, 685 (1977).
68. 66 ll.2d 276, 362 N.E.2d 681 (1977).
69. Id. at 285, 362 N.E.2d at 685.
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the contrary, the Weatherford opinion was quoted verbatim for the
very proposition which, as argued by Justice Marshall, twists Black
and O'Brien beyond recognition. The court simply restated the
Weatherford Court's interpretation of Black and O'Brien as cases in-
dicating that when conversations with counsel have been overheard,
the validity of the conviction depends on whether the overheard con-
versations produced any evidence presented at trial. 70 Noting that the
confidential materials of the interview had been disclosed to the pros-
ecution and used at trial, the Knippenberg court found that, not-
withstanding the reduced protection afforded by Weatherford, the
violation of the attorney-client relationship was clear. 71
Because the court rejected the prosecution's contention that the
error was harmless, it did not reach the question of whether any gov-
ernmental intrusion upon the attorney-client relationship should re-
sult in reversal and retrial. 72 The opinion concludes, however, with
the admonition that the right to assistance of counsel is of first impor-
tance and should not be diminished by attrition. 73 Although the
court appeared to be aware that Weatherford dilutes the right to
counsel, it has followed, perhaps reluctantly, the mandate of that de-
cision.
The per se rule of reversal approved in Black and O'Brien has
been, in effect, repealed by Weatherford. Weatherford erroneously
interpreted Black and O'Brien to be cases which, far from establish-
ing a per se rule, demanded reversal only in situations where tainted
evidence was presented at trial. As the Knippenberg opinion amply
demonstrates, quoting the error verbatim, it is this interpretation of
Black and O'Brien that most likely will prevail. Thus, while purpor-
tedly distinguishing Black and O'Brien, the Weatherford Court,
promulgating its own interpretation, effectively invalidated the rule of
those decisions.
The Court's action provides a narrow opening to the practice of
spying upon attorney-client discussions. 74 A defendant must now
prove intent on the part of the government to intercept confidential
communications, or disclosure of those communications to the pros-
ecution, or perhaps both. 75 As Justice Marshall pragmatically ob-
70. Id. at 286, 362 N.E.2d at 685.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 288, 362 N.E.2d at 686.
74. 429 U.S. at 562 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75. The Court did not explicitly state what requirements of proof must be met in order to
obtain relief from government intrusions of this nature. The Court merely indicated that, had
Bursey proved intent or disclosure, he might have had a "much stronger case." Id. at 554.
19771
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
served, a "rule that offers defendants relief only when they can prove
'intent' or 'disclosure' is . . . little better than no rule at all."76 In-
deed, nothing short of a rule of automatic reversal can adequately
protect the right to private consultation with counsel. The Court
would do well to more jealously guard such a precious constitutional
right.
Weatherford is nonetheless representative of a trend in the field of
criminal procedure. The tide of decisions expanding the rights of a
criminal defendant has ebbed in the days of the Burger Court. 77
Warren Court decisions have been eviscerated by narrow interpreta-
tions, nonretroactive applications, and generous construction of the
harmless error doctrine. 78 The Fifth Amendment's protection against
self-incrimination has been abridged by decisions holding that state-
ments obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona 79 can be admissi-
ble for impeachment purposes. 80 The Fourth Amendment's guaran-
tee against unreasonable searches and seizures has suffered as well in
that the Burger Court has given the constitutional imprimatur to all
searches incident to arrest. 81 As Justice Brennan recently observed,
the Sixth Amendment guarantee has fared no better.8 2  Weatherford
plainly illustrates the Court's retreat in this area.
A partial solution to the problems posed by decisions such as
Weatherford is suggested by a recent state court development. Since
Having left the question of proof open, the Court could conceivably establish, in a future case,
even more rigid requirements of proof.
76. Id. at 565 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
77. Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA.
L. REv. 873, 905 (1976). See also notes 78-82 and accompanying text infra.
78. Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger
Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 423-24 (1974).
79. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
80. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) the Court held that statements obtained
from a defendant without first advising him of his rights as required by Miranda were
nevertheless admissible to impeach his credibility as a witness at trial. See also Lego v.
Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), in which the Court ruled that the voluntariness of a confession is
to be determined by a mere preponderance of the evidence.
81. In United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) the Court abandoned case-by-case
adjudication of the reasonableness of searches under the Fourth Amendment by ruling that a
full search of the person is per se reasonable once the fact of custodial arrest has been estab-
lished. See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) in which the Court held that
consent searches can be justified by the prosecution without proof that the subject of the search
had knowledge of his right to refuse consent.
82. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HAR%1. L. REV.
489, 497 (1977). See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) in which the per se rule announced in
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967),
excluding identification testimony obtained in the absence of counsel, was held not to apply to a
pre-indictment police station lineup. The Court reasoned that such a procedure, occuring before
indictment, was not a critical stage of the prosecution.
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Supreme Court interpretation of federal constitutional guarantees es-
tablishes only the minimum protection that a state must grant,8 3
many state courts have accepted the Burger Court's retrenchment in
the field of criminal procedure as an invitation to adopt more exacting
standards based on identical language in their state constitutions. 84
Supreme Court review is thus evaded, because the Court has no
jurisdiction to review state law decisions which are based on
'adequate' and 'independent' state law grounds. 85  Applauding this
development, Justice Brennan has suggested that it would be most
unwise these days for counsel to raise only federal constitutional is-
sues. 86  Indeed, for a criminal defendant who seeks to preserve the
sanctity of his attorney-client relationship, the pleading of state con-
stitutional issues seems to be the only viable course.
Linda Weathers
83. Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. CIV.
RPGrrs-Civ. LaB. L. REv. 271, 285 (1973). See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) C(a State
is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this
Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards").
84. Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA.
L. REV. 873, 899 (1976); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977). See, e.g., cases dealing with state constitutional guarantees:
Blue v. Alaska, 558 P.2d 636 (1977) (right to counsel); Allen v. Superior Court of Alameda
County, 18 Cal.3d 520, 557 P.2d 65, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1976) (privilege against self-incrimina-
tion); People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972) (prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments); People v. Counterman, - Colo. - , 556 P.2d 481
(1976) (prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures); State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254,
492 P.2d 657 (1971) (privilege against self-incrimination); State v. Mora, - La. - , 330
So.2d 900 (1976) (prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures); State v. Sklar, -
Me. -, 317 A.2d 160 (1974) (right to trial by jury); People v. Cooper, 398 Mich. 450, 247
N.W.2d 866 (1976) (Double Jeopardy Clause); State v. Phinney, - N.H. - , 370 A.2d 1153
(1977) (privilege against self-incrimination); State v. Johnson, - N.J.- , 346 A.2d 66 (1975)
(prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures); State v. Gallagher, - Ohio
St.2d-, 348 N.E.2d 336 (1976) (privilege against self-incrimination); Commonwealth v.
Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351 (1974) (right to counsel); State v. Opperman, - S.D.
-, 247 N.W.2d 673 (1976) (prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures).
As the above list makes clear, the courts of certain states are more likely to adopt expansive
interpretations of state constitutional guarantees. For a short profile of each state identifying
promising features of its bill of rights law, see Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State
Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 271, 322-50 (1973).
85. For discussion of the adequate state ground doctrine in the context of 'evasion' cases, see
Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure Revisited, 64 Ky. L.J. 729, 749-50 (1976);
Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873, 891-94 (1975);
Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court,
62 Ky. L.J. 421, 426-31 (1974); Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of
Rights, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 271, 312-15 (1973).
86. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489, 502 (1977).

